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Abstract
The static neoclassical theory of a consumer and its dynamization
by dynamic optimization yield equal results. On the other hand, the
Ramsey (1928) macro model of consumption dynamics does not ex-
plain the dynamics of real consumption of an individual consumer.
As a solution to these problems, we present a dynamic theory of a
consumer consistent with the static neoclassical theory. We define
the ‘economic force’ by which the consumer acts upon his consump-
tion and show that the adjustment in a utility-seeking way may be
stable or unstable. The proposed framework allows the modelling of
economic growth together with optimal behavior as is assumed in the
static neoclassical framework. (JEL D21, O12)
Keywords: Consumption dynamics, economic force, instability.
∗The proofs should be sent to Mr. Estola in the above given address.
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1 Introduction
Mirowski (1989b) shows that the progenitors of neoclassical economics con-
sciously imitated classical mechanics. The concept of equilibrium, for exam-
ple, was introduced in economics from physics by Canard in 1801 (Mirowski
1989a). Although equilibrium means a ‘balance of forces’ situation, in eco-
nomics the balancing ‘forces’ have not been defined. In spite of this, the use
of the term ‘force’ is common in economics; see Lucas (1988) for example.
The ‘invisible hand’ by Adam Smith, for instance, serves as an example of
how the concept of ‘force field’ has been applied in economics.
Static neoclassical theory as a whole is an application of equilibrium anal-
ysis. Static analysis is not, however, in accordance with the observed evolu-
tionary behavior of economies. The assumption that economic agents behave
in an optimal way prohibits the understanding of dynamics because no agent
likes to change his optimal behavior. In physics, too, the equilibrium states
of various dynamic systems were understood before Newton defined his dy-
namic laws where equilibrium states are special cases of dynamic systems.
Here we propose a new framework for modelling in economics by assuming
that economic agents like to better their situation when possible. We believe
that the willingness of economic agents to better their situation is the fun-
damental cause of economic dynamics. We demonstrate the applicability of
this framework in modelling consumer behavior.
Our approach offers three advantages compared with the existing prin-
ciples of economic modelling: 1) Dynamic optimization as a mathematical
technique is not needed. 2) Static neoclassical theory is a special case in our
modelling — the zero-force situation — and so only one framework is needed.
3) Our framework covers also cases where a static optimum does not exist.
2 Static Neoclassical Theory of a Consumer
We assume a consumer’s decision-making situation as simple as possible.
The length of the time horizon of the consumer is assumed to be one week,
and the consumer can choose his weekly consumption of only two goods the
consumer consumes every week. For clarity, let good 1 be ‘food’ and good
2 ‘playing video games’ according to the traditional choice between ’food or
fun’. The consumer is assumed to have budgeted a fixed amount of money T
($/week) for his weekly consumption, and the unit prices of food and playing
video games are p1 ($/kg) and p2 ($/h), respectively
1. The weekly budget
1A system of measurement units for economics is given in de Jong (1967). Measurement
units are in braces after the quantities.
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of the consumer is then T = p1q1 + p2q2 where the consumption flows of the
two goods are denoted by q1 (kg/week) and q2 (h/week).
The consumer has a continuous scalar valued weekly utility function u =
f(q1, q2). To be able to write well-defined mathematical expressions with
the utility function, we give measurement unit ut for utility. The consumer
spends all the money he has budgeted for his consumption for the week during
the week, and so the satisfaction he gains from his consumption takes place
at the week. The values of utility function u = f(q1, q2) are then measured
in units ut/week. Utility u thus measures the average flow of satisfaction the
consumer gains during the week.
The explicit measuring of utility is not needed in modelling consumer
behavior, however. Utility is only an auxiliary quantity required in defining
the willingness-to-pay of a consumer for various things. Every utility function
that expresses the same preference order of a consumer defines a measurement
unit for utility according to the values of the function. However, all utility
functions expressing the same preference order of a consumer give the same
‘willingness-to-pay’ values for goods near the consumer’s optimum, see the
Appendix. The actual measuring problems of the level of satisfaction of a
consumer can thus be omitted with these remarks.
The average utility of a good for a consumer is measured by dividing the
utility of the consumer by his consumption of the good at the time unit. The
average utility of food and playing video games in a week are thus
u
q1
=
f(q1, q2)
q1
and
u
q2
=
f(q1, q2)
q2
with units (ut/week)/(kg/week) = ut/kg and (ut/week)/(h/week) = ut/h,
respectively; they measure the average satisfaction the consumer gains from
one kilogram of food and one hour of playing video games at the week.
The consumer’s marginal utilities of the two goods are
∂f(q10 , q20)
∂q1
> 0,
∂f(q10 , q20)
∂q2
> 0,
where q10 , q20 are fixed flows of consumption. The measurement unit of the
marginal utility of a good is the same as that of average utility.
From the weekly budget equation we get q2 =
(
T−p1q1
)
/p2. Substituting
this in the utility function gives
u = f
(
q1, q2
)
= f
(
q1,
T − p1q1
p2
)
≡ F (q1, T, p1, p2). (2)
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Static neoclassical theory assumes optimal behavior. The optimal weekly
consumption of food q∗1 can be solved from the following equation
du
dq1
= 0 ⇔ ∂f
∂q1
− p1
p2
∂f
∂q2
= 0 ⇔ 1
p1
∂f
∂q1
=
1
p2
∂f
∂q2
, (3)
which can also be presented according to (2) as
∂F
∂q1
=
∂f
∂q1
− p1
p2
∂f
∂q2
= 0.
A sufficient condition for maximum is that
d2u
dq21
=
∂2f
∂q21
− ∂
2f
∂q2∂q1
p1
p2
+
∂2f
∂q22
(
p1
p2
)2
− ∂
2f
∂q1∂q2
p1
p2
< 0. (4)
Non-increasing marginal utility makes ∂2f/∂q21, ∂
2f/∂q22 non-positive. The
first and third additive terms in (4) are thus non-positive. If the partial
functions of a multi-variable function are continuous, then ∂2f/(∂q1∂q2) =
∂2f/(∂q2∂q1) holds (Apostol (1979) p. 360). Now, assuming the partial func-
tions of the utility function continuous, the sufficient condition for maximum
is that ∂2f/∂q2∂q1 > 0. Thus the greater the flow of food consumption,
the more the consumer enjoys increasing his playing of video games when he
consumes in the limits of his budget.
3 Dynamic Theories of Consumption
3.1 Dynamization by Dynamic Optimization
A common principle to model economic dynamics is to assume that eco-
nomic agents maximize their target functions over a finite or infinite future.
We continue analyzing the two-good situation and now we assume that the
consumption flows of the two goods depend on time t with unit week. From
the weekly budget equation we get q2(t) =
(
T − p1q1(t)
)
/p2, where the other
quantities except the consumption flows are assumed fixed. Substituting this
in the utility function gives
u(t) = f
(
q1(t),
T − p1q1(t)
p2
)
≡ F (q1(t), T, p1, p2). (5)
Assuming that the consumer lives an infinite time, the dynamic optimization
problem of the consumer becomes the following
max
q1(t)
∫ ∞
0
u(t)dt = max
q1(t)
∫ ∞
0
F (q1(t), T, p1, p2)dt.
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The Euler equation of this dynamic optimization problem is
∂F
∂q1
− d
dt
(
∂F
∂q′1(t)
)
= 0 ⇒ ∂F
∂q1
= 0.
The necessary condition for this optimization problem equals with Eq. (3)
because quantity q′f (t) does not exist in function F . Dynamic optimization as
a technique thus does not give an equation of motion for the consumer’s food
consumption as was expected. For dynamic optimization to give an equation
of motion for the consumption of a consumer, either the target function or
the budget equation must be changed from that of static analysis. However,
then the two frameworks of modelling are not consistent with each other.
3.2 The Ramsey Model
The inconsistency described in the previous section has lead to a situation
that a dynamic model for the real consumption of a consumer does not
exist. On the other hand, the dynamics of consumption has been modelled
at the aggregate level by the model of Ramsey (1928). The Ramsey model is
presented here according to Chiang (1992 pp. 111-116) because of the more
convenient notation. Ramsey assumed that an economy can either save or
consume all production,
C(t) = Q
(
K(t), L(t)
)−K ′(t), S(t) = K ′(t) ⇒ C(t)+S(t) = Q(K(t), L(t))
where C is aggregate consumption, K aggregate capital, Q aggregate pro-
duction, L aggregate amount of labor available and S aggregate saving of
the economy. Social utility is measured by function U(C) with U ′(C) > 0,
U ′′(C) < 0. In the production of consumption goods, the society needs labor
which causes disutility D(L). Net social utility N(C,L) is then
N(C,L) = U(C)−D(L).
The economic planner’s problem is to minimize the deviation of the social
utility for the current and all future generations to come from the maximum
possible attainable utility denoted by B (Bliss):
min
L(t),K(t)
∫ ∞
0
[B − U(C(t)) +D(L(t))]dt, C(t) = Q(K(t), L(t))−K ′(t)
subject to K(0) = K0. The integrand is thus
G(t) = B − U
(
Q
(
K(t), L(t)
)−K ′(t))+D(L(t)).
5
The Euler equations for this dynamic minimization problem are:
∂G
∂L
− d
dt
(
∂G
∂L′(t)
)
= 0 ⇔ −U ′(C)∂C
∂L
+D′(L) = 0, (6)
∂G
∂K
− d
dt
(
∂G
∂K ′(t)
)
= 0 ⇔ −U ′(C) ∂C
∂K
− d
dt
U ′(C) = 0, (7)
where ∂G/∂L′(t) = 0, ∂C/∂L = ∂Q/∂L and ∂C/∂K = ∂Q/∂K. Writing
Eq, (6) as
U ′(C)
∂Q
∂L
= D′(L)
we see that in the optimum the marginal disutility from work equals the
product of marginal utility of consumption and marginal productivity of
labor. Eq. (7) can be rewritten as
−
d
dt
(U ′(C))
U ′(C)
=
∂Q
∂K
. (8)
We can read this so that the growth rate of the marginal utility of consump-
tion must at every point in time equal with the marginal productivity of
capital. Another way to understand Eq. (8) is to write the left hand side as
−
d
dt
(U ′(C))
U ′(C)
= −U
′′(C)
U ′(C)
C ′(t)
where U ′′(C) < 0. Then Eq. (8) becomes
C ′(t) = − ∂Q
∂K
U ′(C)
U ′′(C)
. (9)
From (9) we can read that consumption increases C ′(t) > 0 the faster the
greater the marginal productivity of capital ∂Q/∂K and the higher the
marginal utility of consumption U ′(C).
The Ramsey model explains the dynamics of the aggregate money flow
directed for consumption in an economy, and so it does not dynamize the
static neoclassical theory of the real consumption of a consumer.
4 A Dynamic Theory of Real Consumption
Here we model dynamic consumer behavior so that the optimal behavior
assumed in the static neoclassical framework corresponds to an equilibrium
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state in this. We continue analyzing the two-good situation, and let the con-
sumer’s weekly utility function be as in section 3.1, u(t) = f
(
q1(t), q2(t)
)
=
f
(
q1(t),
T−p1q1(t)
p2
)
. The consumer is assumed to adjust his consumption flows
of the two goods to increase his weekly utility with time. The consumer can
now affect his weekly utility only by quantity q1 because other quantities
in the function are constants and q2 is substituted by the budget equation.
Differentiating the function with respect to time, we get
u′(t) =
du
dq1
q′1(t) =
(
∂f
∂q1
− p1
p2
∂f
∂q2
)
q′1(t). (10)
In (10), the unit of u′(t) is ut/week2 and that of q′1(t) is kg/week
2; u′(t) and
q′1(t) are thus the instantaneous acceleration of utility and food consumption
while u and q1 are the corresponding velocities.
The consumer is assumed to adjust his consumption with time to increase
his weekly utility. The adjustment rules for food consumption are: q′1(t) > 0 if
du
dq1
> 0, q′1(t) < 0 if
du
dq1
< 0 and q′1(t) = 0 if
du
dq1
= 0. These adjustments make
the right hand side of Eq. (10) positive and then the weekly utility increases
with time, u′(t) > 0. The condition for the equilibrium state q′1(t) = 0,
du
dq1
= 0 ⇔ ∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
= 0 ⇔ ∂f
∂q1
1
p1
=
∂f
∂q2
1
p2
, (11)
corresponds to the optimal state of the consumer given earlier.
Because ∂f
∂q1
, ∂f
∂q2
, p1 and p2 are positive, multiplying the consumer’s ad-
justment inequalities of food consumption by factor p2/
∂f
∂q1
> 0 we get
q′1(t) > 0 if
p2
∂f
∂q2
∂f
∂q1
− p1 > 0,
q′1(t) < 0 if
p2
∂f
∂q2
∂f
∂q1
− p1 < 0,
q′1(t) = 0 if
p2
∂f
∂q2
∂f
∂q1
− p1 = 0.
Analogous adjustment rules can be derived for playing video games. This is
done as follows. Solve the budget equation with respect to q1(t), use this to
substitute q1(t) from the utility function and differentiate it with respect to
time. After this, define the adjustment rules as we did above. Quantities
h1 =
(
∂f
∂q1
/
∂f
∂q2
)
p2, h2 =
(
∂f
∂q2
/
∂f
∂q1
)
p1
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derived in this way have units $/kg and $/h, respectively, and we can in-
terpret them as this consumer’s willingness-to-pay for one kilogram of food
and for one hour of playing video games, respectively. The explanation is
following. A utility-seeking consumer compares the above quantities and the
prices of the goods, and increases the consumption of that good for which
the above quantity is greater than the price, and decreases the consumption
of that good for which the quantity is smaller than the price. The consumer
must pay the price of the good the consumption of which he increases, and
he does not pay the price of the good the consumption of which he decreases.
Thus when h1 > p1, a utility-seeking consumer pays the price of good 1. This
behavior is empirically testable by making a questionnaire about consumers’
willingness-to-pay for a good and comparing these with its price.
A consumer’s willingness-to-pay for food is the greater the higher the
∂f/∂q1 and the smaller the quantity
∂f
∂q2
/p2 with unit ut/$. The latter mea-
sures the consumer’s marginal utility of budgeted funds for the week. We can
show this by differentiating the utility function in (2) with respect to T ,
∂u
∂T
=
∂f
∂q2
1
p2
.
If we substitute q1 from the utility function by using the budget equation,
we get for the marginal utility of budgeted funds as ∂u
∂T
= ∂f
∂q1
/p1. In the
consumer’s optimum these two quantities are equal, see (3).
In the Appendix we show that a consumer’s willingness-to-pay for a good
is independent on the chosen utility function: any continuous function ex-
pressing the same preference order gives an equal willingness-to-pay for a good
in the neighborhood of a consumer’s optimum. The ambiguity in measuring
utility thus does not affect our modelling because different marginal utilities
given by different utility functions divided by marginal utilities of budgeted
funds by the same utility function give equal willingness-to-pay values.
4.1 A Consumer’s Willingness-To-Pay and Demand
A consumer’s willingness-to-pay for food
h1 =
(
∂f(q1, q2)
∂q1
/
∂f(q1, q2)
∂q2
)
p2 (12)
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has the following characteristics:
∂h1
∂q1
=
(
∂2f
∂q21
− ∂2f
∂q1∂q2
p1
p2
)
∂f
∂q2
− ∂f
∂q1
(
∂2f
∂q2∂q1
− ∂2f
∂q22
p1
p2
)
(
∂f
∂q2
)2 p2, (13)
∂h1
∂T
=
∂2f
∂q2∂q1
∂f
∂q2
− ∂f
∂q1
∂2f
∂q22(
∂f
∂q2
)2 , (14)
∂h1
∂p2
=
(
∂2f
∂q22
∂f
∂q1
− ∂2f
∂q2∂q1
∂f
∂q2
)(
T−p1q1
p2
)
(
∂f
∂q2
)2 + ∂f∂q1∂f
∂q2
. (15)
The law of non-increasing marginal utility
∂2f
∂q21
≤ 0, ∂
2f
∂q22
≤ 0,
and the positiveness of the second order cross partial
∂
(
∂f
∂q2
)
∂q1
=
∂2f
∂q1∂q2
=
∂2f
∂q2∂q1
=
∂
(
∂f
∂q1
)
∂q2
make ∂h1/∂q1 < 0 and ∂h1/∂T > 0. In ∂h1/∂q1, the first term in braces
in the numerator is negative, the latter term in braces is positive and the
denominator is positive. The condition for ∂h1/∂q1 < 0, ∂h1/∂T > 0 is thus
the same as that the equilibrium point maximizes the consumer’s weekly
utility. In ∂h1/∂p2, the first additive term is negative and the latter is positive
and so the sign is ambiguous.
The following equation corresponds to the consumer’s optimum,
p1 = h1 ⇔ p1 =
(
∂f(q1, q2)
∂q1
/
∂f(q1, q2)
∂q2
)
p2. (16)
We call Eq. (16) the demand relation for food of this consumer. The demand
relation is similar to that of the willingness-to-pay, but their slopes in coor-
dinate system (q1, $/kg) differ. We show this next. By totally differentiating
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Eq. (16) and using the utility function in (2), we get1 +
(
∂2f
∂q2∂q1
∂f
∂q2
− ∂2f
∂q22
∂f
∂q1
)
q1(
∂f
∂q2
)2
 dp1
=

(
∂2f
∂q21
− ∂2f
∂q2∂q1
p1
p2
)
∂f
∂q2
−
(
∂2f
∂q1∂q2
− ∂2f
∂q22
p1
p2
)
∂f
∂q1(
∂f
∂q2
)2 p2
 dq1
+
 ∂2f∂q2∂q1 ∂f∂q2 − ∂2f∂q22 ∂f∂q1(
∂f
∂q2
)2
 dT
+

(
∂2f
∂q22
∂f
∂q1
− ∂2f
∂q2∂q1
∂f
∂q2
)(
T−p1q1
p2
)
(
∂f
∂q2
)2 + ∂f∂q1∂f
∂q2
 dp2. (17)
We can present Eq. (17) as
a1dp1 = a2dq1 + a3dT + a4dp2, a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0, (18)
where by ai, i = 1, . . . , 4 are denoted the coefficients of the differentials of
which a4 is of ambiguous sign. From (18) we can solve
∂p1
∂q1
∣∣∣
dT=dp2=0
=
a2
a1
< 0,
∂p1
∂T
∣∣∣
dq1=dp2=0
=
a3
a1
> 0,
∂p1
∂q2
∣∣∣
dT=dq1=0
=
a4
a1
,
where the sign of the last partial is ambiguous. Because p1, h1 both have
unit $/kg, they can be measured on the same coordinate axis. The slope
∂p1
∂q1
= a2
a1
< 0 of the demand relation (16) in coordinate system (q1, $/kg)
deviates from that of the willingness-to-pay: ∂h1
∂q1
= a2 < 0. Because a1 > 1,
the latter of the curves is steeper. The reason for this is the income effect a
change in price has on the willingness-to-pay. If the price of food decreases, a
consumer’s utility maximizing flow of food consumption increases. However,
a price decrease raises the real budgeted funds of the consumer and moves his
willingness-to-pay relation away from the origin. A price increase analogously
moves the willingness-to-pay relation toward the origin.
Equations (12) and (16) give similar results concerning how quantities
q1, T, p2 affect the optimal flow of food consumption of the consumer, and
they both are useful. The demand relation is estimable from the real world
by statistical methods with observed prices and consumption flows, and the
willingness-to-pay relation can be quantified by making a questionnaire.
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Example 1. Let the weekly utility function of a consumer be u = aq1q2,
where a with unit (ut×week)/(kg×h) is a positive constant and the budget
equation as earlier. With this utility function the marginal utilities are
∂u
∂q1
= aq2 > 0,
∂u
∂q2
= aq1 > 0,
and the sufficient condition for maximal utility holds,
∂2u
∂q21
=
∂2u
∂q22
= 0,
∂2u
∂q1∂q2
=
∂2u
∂q2∂q1
= a > 0.
Solving q2 from the budget equation and setting in the utility function gives
u =
aq1
p2
(T − p1q1) .
The necessary condition for optimization is then
du
dq1
= 0 ⇔ a
p2
(T − 2p1q1) = 0 ⇒ q∗1 =
T
2p1
⇔ p1 = T
2q1
, (19)
and the sufficient condition for maximum holds: d2u/dq21 = −2ap1/p2 < 0.
We call function q∗1 this consumer’s demand function of food, and the last
form of the equation his inverse demand function of food. Price p2 does not
affect q∗1 in this case which result is caused by the assumed form for the utility
function. The consumer’s willingness-to-pay for food is
h1 = p2
∂u
∂q1
∂u
∂q2
where
∂u
∂q1
= aq2,
∂u
∂q2
= aq1.
Thus
h1 =
p2q2
q1
=
T
q1
− p1; (20)
the latter form is obtained by substituting the budget equation p2q2 = T −
p1q1 in (20). Another way to derive the willingness-to-pay is to divide
∂u
∂q1
=
aq2 by
∂u
∂T
= aq1/p2. In the optimum h1 = p1. ¦
Example 2. Let a consumer’s weekly utility function be
u = A(aq1)
c(bq2)
1−c, (21)
where the quantities are as earlier, constants A, a, b > 0 have units ut/week,
week/kg, week/h, respectively, and 0 < c < 1 is a pure number. Utility is
thus measured in units ut/week, and the terms in braces are dimensionless as
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they should for dimensional consistency. Marginal utilities of the two goods
with units ut/kg, ut/h, respectively, are
∂u
∂q1
= Aac(aq1)
c−1(bq2)1−c > 0, (22)
∂u
∂q2
= Ab(1− c)(aq1)c(bq2)−c > 0, (23)
and the second order partials are:
∂2u
∂q21
= Aa2c(c− 1)(aq1)c−2(bq2)1−c < 0,
∂2u
∂q22
= −Ab2c(1− c)(aq1)c(bq2)−c−1 < 0,
∂2u
∂q2∂q1
= Aabc(1− c)(aq1)c−1(bq2)−c > 0.
Marginal utilities are thus decreasing and the unique second order cross par-
tial is positive; thus the sufficient condition for maximal utility holds. Sub-
stituting the earlier assumed budget equation in the utility function, we get
u = A(aq1)
c
(
b[T − p1q1]
p2
)1−c
.
The necessary condition for the consumer’s optimum is
du
dq1
= 0 ⇔ Aca(aq1)c−1
(
b[T − p1q1]
p2
)1−c
−A(1− c)(aq1)c
(
b[T − p1q1]
p2
)−c
bp1
p2
= 0. (24)
From (24) we get the consumer’s demand and inverse demand functions of
food as
q∗1 =
cT
p1
⇔ p1 = cT
q1
. (25)
An increase in T increases and an increase in p1 decreases the consumer’s
optimal flow of food consumption q∗1. Price p2 does not affect q
∗
1 also in this
case. If we multiply the first order condition (24) by factor
(aq1)
−c
(
b[T−p1q1]
p2
)c
p2
Ab(1− c) > 0,
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we get
c
1− c
(
T
q1
− p1
)
− p1 = 0
where h1 =
c
1−c
(
T
q1
− p1
)
is the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for food. No-
tice that we could have derived the willingness-to-pay also as
h1 = p2
∂u
∂q1
∂u
∂q2
=
cp2q2
(1− c)q1 ,
where ∂u
∂q1
, ∂u
∂q2
are as in (22) and (23), respectively, and substituting there
p2q2 = T − p1q1 from the budget equation.
Solving the budget equation for q1, substituting this in the utility function
and optimizing with respect to q2, we get the optimal consumption flow of
playing video games as q∗2 = (1− c)T/p2 (h/week). Another way to get this
result is to substitute q∗1 in the budget equation and solve it for q2. ¦
Assuming the following values for the constants c = 0.7, T = 100, we can
present the demand and willingness-to-pay -relations in Examples 1, 2 with
two values for p1: p10 = 10 and p11 = 20. The functions in Example 1 are
presented in Figure 1 and those in Example 2 in Figure 2. Notice that the
demand relation (the thick curve) is graphed in both figures in the form of
inverse demand. Figures 1, 2 show how the demand and willingness-to-pay
relations are related to each other. Both are decreasing with increasing flow
of food consumption, and the demand relation stays constant with a price
change while the willingness-to-pay relation moves so that the two curves
cross each other at current price.
Figure 1. The demand and two willingness-to-pay relations of food
Figure 2. The demand and two willingness-to-pay relations of food
The optimal flow of food consumption of this consumer can be presented
graphically as the crossing point of the horizontal line representing the price
of food and the demand relations in (19) and (25). In these points, the
willingness-to-pay and demand schedules cross too, and they both define the
same optimal flow of food consumption q∗1, see Figures 1, 2.
4.2 Newtonian Theory of a Consumer
The dynamic consumer behavior studied in the previous section can be mod-
elled mathematically as follows. We set q′1(t) to depend positively on quantity
du
dq1
so that q′1(t) = 0 when
du
dq1
= ∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
= 0. This corresponds to
q′1(t) = g(F1), g
′(F1) > 0, g(0) = 0, F1 =
du
dq1
, (26)
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where g is a function with the above characteristics. The first order Taylor
series approximation of function g in the neighborhood of the optimum point
F1 =
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
= 0 is
g(F1) = g(0) + g
′(0)(F1 − 0) + ² = g′(0)× F1 + ².
Assuming that ² = 0 we can approximate Eq. (26) as
q′1(t) = g
′(0)× F1 ⇔ q′1(t) = g′(0)×
(
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
)
(27)
where g′(0) > 0 is a constant. The unit of q′1(t) is kg/week
2, that of ∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
is ut/kg and the unit of g′(0) equals with that of g′(F1) = dq′1(t)/dF1 which
is (kg/week)2/ut. Eq. (27) is thus dimensionally homogeneous.
Now q′1(t) is the instantaneous acceleration of food consumption of the
consumer. If the reason ∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
for this acceleration is named as the
force acting upon the food consumption of this consumer, we can denote
g′(0) = 1/m1 and name the positive constant m1 as the inertial ‘mass’ of
food consumption of this consumer. Equation (27) is then of the same form
as the Newton’s equation of motion, a = (1/m)× F ⇔ F = ma, where a is
acceleration, F force and m the mass of the moving particle.
‘Mass’ m1 is the ratio between force and acceleration and it measures
the sensitivity of the flow of food consumption of this consumer with re-
spect to the force. The factors affecting m1 are those which slow down
changes in the flow of food consumption of this consumer; limited knowl-
edge of compensating goods, time to find such goods etc. The inertial
‘mass’ of food consumption can be measured via the force and acceleration
as m1 =
(
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
)
/q′1(t) when these quantities are known and deviate
from zero. This corresponds to the definition of inertial mass in physics.
In all economic behavior, various inertial factors exist. For example, being
habited in a good makes us reluctant to change it. Practising new things is
many times repulsive even though we know we would gain from that. Various
kinds of costs may also be related to a consumer’s change of his bundle of
consumption flows of goods, such as changing the nearest grocery store to a
supermarket further away. Due to these reasons, the bundle of consumption
flows of goods of a consumer may stay constant even though he directs non-
zero forces upon his consumption of some goods. This phenomena can be
added in the model in the form of static friction.
It is common in economics to talk about adjustment or transaction costs
instead of static friction. Static friction is, however, a more general concept
which contains also other factors resisting changes than the costs related to
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them. When we add static friction in the model we can explain by it that
many times a consumer changes his bundle of consumption flows of goods
only when the reasons become compelling enough. This way obtained model
for dynamic consumer behavior is
m1q
′
1(t) =
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
+ FS1, (28)
where the static friction force with unit ut/kg is denoted by FS1.
Static friction FS1 contains factors that resist changes in the consumer’s
food consumption not included in his utility function and budget equation:
laziness, stubborn habits, costs and trouble from changing food consumption
etc. Measuring the static friction of a consumer requires the measuring of
these factors and the definition of a weighted average of them with unit
ut/kg. This, however, is omitted and static friction is treated as an unknown
quantity the numerical value of which can be estimated by Eq. (28).
According to Eq. (28), q′1(t) > 0 when
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
+ FS1 > 0 and vice
versa. Further, FS1 < 0 when
∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
> 0 and vice versa, and |FS1|
≤ | ∂f
∂q1
− ∂f
∂q2
p1
p2
|. The consumer thus changes his flow of food consumption only
if the net benefit from this exceeds his static friction. Static friction does not
affect the dynamics of food consumption after the adjustment has began, that
is, after the active force component has exceeded the static friction. Static
friction only explains that the flow of food consumption may not always be
changed when the active force component deviates from zero.
Example 3. Let the utility function of a consumer be u = aq1q2 where a
with unit (ut×week)/(kg×h) is a positive constant and the budget equation
as earlier. This functional form is assumed because it gives a simple form for
the Newtonian equation of food consumption. If we had applied, for example,
function (21) for utility, a quite complicated equation would result.
Solving the budget equation with respect to q2 and substituting in the
utility function, we get
u =
aq1
p2
(T − p1q1) .
The force acting upon the food consumption of this consumer is then
du
dq1
=
a
p2
(T − 2p1q1) .
The Newtonian equation of food consumption with this force is
m1q
′
1(t) =
du
dq1
⇔ m1q′1(t) =
a
p2
(
T − 2p1q1(t)
)
. (29)
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The solution of this differential equation is
q1(t) =
T
2p1
+ C0e
− 2ap1
p2m1
t
, (30)
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, C0 = q1(0)− T/2p1 (kg/week)
the constant of integration and time t has unit week. According to (30),
q1(t) approaches its optimal value q
∗
1 = T/2p1 with time because the expo-
nential term vanishes with t → +∞. The asymptotic equilibrium state thus
corresponds to the zero force situation assumed in the neoclassical theory.
In this example, the force was presented in the form du/dq1 and not in
the form of h1 − p1. The latter form of the force would be
T
q1
− 2p1,
and if the Newtonian equation of food consumption is constructed with this
force, the following non-linear differential equation results
T
q1
− 2p1 = m11q′1(t) ⇔ T − 2p1q1 = m11q1q′1(t)
the solution of which is much more difficult; notice that the positive constant
m11 deviates from that of m1. Because quantities
a
p2
(T − 2p1q1) and T
q1
− 2p1,
are simultaneously positive and negative — they have equal zero points with
positive values of q1 — they both can be applied as the force acting upon
food consumption of this consumer. The advantage of the former is a more
simple Newtonian equation and that of the latter is measurability; it has
unit $/kg while the former has ut/kg. Notice that force du/dq1 was derived
so that the budget constraint was included in the utility function. Without
this, the derivative would not function as a force.
Substituting (30) in the budget equation, the consumer’s weekly con-
sumption of video games can be solved as
q2(t) =
T
2p2
− C0p1
p2
e
− 2ap1
p2m1
t
.
The asymptotic equilibrium thus corresponds to the consumer’s optimal sit-
uation: q∗1 = T/2p1, q
∗
2 = T/2p2. ¦
The dynamic consumer behavior presented in this section has still one
advantage as compared with the static neoclassical framework. Because time
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is omitted from the static neoclassical analysis, in that framework we cannot
study how a consumer’s changing wealth with time affects his consumption.
In the proposed framework, this can be done as follows. Suppose a consumer
gains wealth so that he can steadily increase funds for his consumption. The
budgeted funds for his weekly consumption are then a function of time, and
we assume a linear form for the function: T (t) = T0 + bt, where T0, b are
positive constants with units $/week, $/week2, respectively, and time t has
unit week. Assuming the utility function as in Example 3, the following
Newtonian equation results
m1q
′
1(t) =
a
p2
(
T (t)− 2p1q1(t)
) ⇔ m1q′1(t) = ap2 (T0 + bt− 2p1q1(t)).
The solution of this is
q1(t) =
2ap1T0 − bp2m1
4ap21
+
bt
2p1
+ C1e
− 2ap1
p2m1
t
,
where C1 (kg/week) is the constant of integration. Now with t→∞, q1(t)→
∞ because even though the exponential term vanishes, the linear time trend
(b/2p1)t increases without limit with time. Notice that b can be as small
as we like, for example 0.1 ($/week2), which causes the weekly increase b∆t
= 0.1 ($/week2) × 1 (week) = 0.1 ($/week) in budgeted funds. The time
dependency in the budget equation means that a static optimum does not
exist. Thus we can model economic growth in the proposed framework which
cannot be done in the neoclassical one. This shows that the neoclassical
framework is not general enough to cover all real world economic behavior.
5 Conclusions
We extended the static neoclassical theory of a consumer into a dynamic
form consistent with the static analysis. In this, we defined the ‘economic
force’ by which the consumer acts upon his consumption. An isomorphism
between economic dynamics and classical mechanics was proposed, which
gives the equilibrium and non-equilibrium analysis in a single framework.
This is possible because both sciences assume causal relations between quan-
tities and use differential equations to model these relations. If we forget the
physical or economic content of the used quantities, we are left with purely
mathematical equations. If then the equations have the same form, we can
interpret the economic quantities in a physical way or vice versa. This has
been demonstrated earlier. The mathematical form of Black-Scholes equation
is identical with a specific heat flow equation in physics, Goodwin’s growth
model is identical with Lotka-Volterra equations in biology etc.
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If the same mathematical model can be applied in different sciences, these
phenomena must be of isomorphic structure. Finding such analogies may
help in the modelling. Lucas (1988) writes: “A successful theory of economic
development clearly needs, in the first place, mechanics that are consistent
with sustained growth and with sustained diversity of income levels. ... so a
useful theory needs also to capture some forces for change in these patterns,
and a mechanics that permits these forces to operate”. We hope that our
framework meets these requirements.
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Appendix: The Uniqueness of the Willingness-To-Pay
Suppose a consumer is consuming n different goods. The following La-
grangian function can then be written for his utility maximization problem
max
x,λ1
L1(x, λ1), L1(x, λ1) = u(x) + λ1
(
T −
n∑
i=1
pixi
)
,
where the vector of consumption flows of the goods is x = (x1, . . . , xn), u(x)
is the weekly utility function and the measurement units of the quantities
are: u : ut/week, T : $/week, xi : (the quantity unit of good i)/week, pi:
$/(the quantity unit of good i), λ1 : ut/$. These units make the function
dimensionally well-defined and the unit of λ1 is suitable for it to measure the
marginal utility of budgeted funds in the optimum; see Varian (1992 p. 108).
The necessary conditions for utility maximization are
∂L1
∂xi
= 0 ⇔ ∂u
∂xi
− λ1pi = 0 i = 1, . . . , n,
∂L1
∂λ1
= 0 ⇔ T −
n∑
i=1
pixi = 0.
From these we can solve
pi =
1
λ1
∂u
∂xi
⇔ λ1 = 1
pi
∂u
∂xi
, i = 1, . . . , n and T =
n∑
i=1
pixi.
According to section 4, quantity (1/λ1)∂u/∂xi measures the willingness-to-
pay of the consumer for one unit of good i in the consumer’s optimum, and
it equals the unit price pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Next we transform the utility function as f(u), where f : R→ R is any
differentiable function with f ′(u) > 0. The Lagrangian becomes then
max
x,λ2
L2(x, λ2), L2(x, λ2) = f(u(x)) + λ2
(
T −
n∑
i=1
pixi
)
.
Excluding utility, the measurement units of the quantities are those as above.
The positive transformation of the utility function changes the measurement
unit of utility so that now any change in utility gets a smaller or greater
numerical value — depending on whether f ′(u) is under or above unity —
compared with that in the first case. We can take care of this by giving a
new measurement unit for utility called utili. This is analogous to that of
measuring length first in units inch and then in units metre, or vice versa.
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The necessary conditions for utility maximization are now
∂L2
∂xi
= 0 ⇔ f ′(u) ∂u
∂xi
− λ2pi = 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
∂L2
∂λ2
= 0 ⇔ T −
n∑
i=1
pixi = 0.
From these we can solve
pi =
f ′(u)
λ2
∂u
∂xi
, i = 1, . . . , n and T =
n∑
i=1
pixi,
where now (f ′(u)/λ2)∂u/∂xi measures the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for
one unit of good i in the optimum. Because prices pi, i = 1, . . . , n were
assumed fixed, comparing the necessary conditions in both two cases we get
f ′(u)
λ2
∂u
∂xi
=
1
λ1
∂u
∂xi
, i = 1, . . . , n.
In the optimum, the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for one unit of good i is
thus independent of the chosen utility function, i = 1, . . . , n. In the latter
case, the numerical value of the marginal utility of budgeted funds adjusts
with transformation f : R→ R so that the above equation holds.
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Figure 1. The demand and two willingness − to − pay relations of food
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Figure 2. The demand and two willingness − to − pay relations of food
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